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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Annotated Sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) and 78-2-2(3)0) confer 
jurisdiction upon this court to hear this matter. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case is before the Court on Certiorari from the Opinion and Order of the 
Court of Appeals, which reversed the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment. This 
Court reviews the Appellate Court's decision for correctness and, in doing so, applies the 
same standard. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following sections of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, §78-14-1, et 
seq., control the outcome of this case. They are set forth in the Appendix section of the 
* 
Appellant's Brief. 
Section 78-14-2 
Section 78-14-3 (10) 
Section 78-14-3(14) (currently numbered as 78-14-3 (15)) 
Section 78-14-3 (20) (currently numbered as 78-14-3 (21)) 
Section 78-14-3 (32) (currently numbered as 78-14-3 (32)) 
Section 78-14-4(1) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
In the latter part of 1994, Suzanne Dowling's (Dowling) daughters were taken to a 
Licensed Clinical Social Worker (Bullen) to receive counseling. Dowling also began a 
form of individual counseling along with her husband James Dowling (James) at that 
time. In January of 1996, James filed for a divorce from Dowling. The divorce was 
finalized on September 26, 1996. Upon the issuance of the Decree of Divorce, James 
announced his intentions to marry Bullen. At this same time Dowling became privy to 
information indicating that Bullen had begun an intimate relationship with James during 
his counseling sessions with her. This intimate relationship occurred prior to James filing 
for divorce. 
Bullen treated James individually and apart from Dowling. In her counseling of 
James, which, incidentally, was to assist in the reparation of the family not its destruction, 
she started an intimate relationship that led to the destruction of Dowling's marriage. 
Dowling was not aware of Bullen's behavior until the Divorce Decree was finalized. 
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Dowling filed suit against Bullen within four years time of learning about Bullen's 
inappropriate relationship with her then husband. The Complaint was filed September 25, 
2000. The Complaint alleged, among other things, alienation of affections because of 
Bullen's inappropriate conduct with James Hoagland. See Complaint, R. at 7 f][51-57. 
Once the Complaint had been filed Bullen moved for summary judgment arguing 
that the matter was barred by Utah Code Ann. section 78-14-4 (1996) of the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act. The District Court reviewed the undisputed facts submitted by the 
parties and ruled in Bullen's favor. 
Dowling appealed the decision arguing that she was not subject to the two year 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitation because Bullen's 
behavior with James was not related to the healthcare/counseling she provided to 
Dowling and her daughters. 2002 UT App. 372 f l 7-10. Rather, the inappropriate 
behavior took place when Bullen and James Hoagland were together. 
The Court of Appeals decided that, when read as a whole, the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act's two year statute of limitation did not govern Dowling's alienation of 
affections allegation. 2002 UT App. 372 f 10. The Court of Appeals ruled that "the 
alleged alienation of affections, while arguably 'relating to or arising out of health care 
rendered' to James, (citations omitted), did not relate to or arise out of the health care 
rendered to Dowling." Id. Presumptively, the Court of Appeals ruled that Dowling's 
claim was to be governed by the general four-year statute of limitation found in Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-25 (1996). See generally 2002 UT App. 372 i l l ; see also 2002 UT 
n 
App. 372111 FN. 2, the Utah Court of Appeals did not reach Dowling's claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 
Statement of the Facts 
1. Suzanne Dowling was married to James Anthony Hoagland, Jr., and they 
resided with their two children in their marital home in Salt Lake City prior to their 
divorce on September 26, 1996. Complaint, R. at 3, f 12. 
2. Therapy was provided first to Dowling's two minor daughters and then 
subsequently to Dowling and James as part of family counseling, which continued until 
approximately June of 1996. Complaint, R. at 3, ff 14-16. 
3. During January of 1996, James Hoagland filed a Petition for Divorce from 
Dowling and Bullen continued to counsel various members of the family. Complaint, R 
at 3, ^ 16 and 18. 
4. In February of 1996, one month after James Hoagland filed for divorce, 
Bullen suggested that Dowling see another counselor, specifically Susan Culbertson. 
Complaint, R. at 3,119. 
5. On or about September 26, 1996, James Hoagland was granted a divorce 
from Dowling. Complaint, R. at 3,120. 
6. During this same time period and in close proximity to the granting of the 
Divorce between James and Dowling, James and Bullen announced that they were dating, 
which ultimately ended in marriage. Complaint, R. at 4, f 21. 
7. Dowling subsequently learned that Bullen and James had initiated an 
intimate relationship prior to James filing for divorce. Complaint, R. at 4,122. 
1
 In actuality the complaint did not assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, rather it 
asserted a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Complaint, R. at 4, ff 23-30. 
Q 
8 On or about September 25, 2000 Dowling filed a complaint against 
Bullen, Trolley Corners Family Therapy Clinic, Canyon Rim Psychotherapy and John 
Does 1-20. Complaint, R at 1, pg. 1. 
9. Dowling sued Bullen under numerous causes of action, including but not 
limited to, negligent infliction of emotional distress and alienation of affection. 
Complaint, R. at 4 and 7, f 23-30 and f 51-58. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the plain language of the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act. The language in the act when read as a whole lead the Appeals 
Court to correctly conclude that Ms. Dowling's alienation of affections claim fell outside 
the parameters of the act and that the factual record in this matter correctly and 
adequately shows this position. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act does not cover Ms. Dowling's 
Alienation of Affections claim and therefore is not applicable in this 
matter. 
The gravamen of this case hinges on the interpretation of the Utah Healthcare 
Malpractice Act (hereinafter the "Act") and whether the Act is broad enough to reach Ms. 
Dowling's Alienation of Affections claim. The Act has various key definitions that 
determine whether claims fall within its parameter. The definition section is found in 78-
14-3. Dowling v. Bullen, 2002 UT App 372 at f5918,1958 P.3d 877 at 878. The two 
definitions that the Court of Appeals focused on in making their ruling were sections 78-
14-3(10) and 78-14-3(15). Code section 78-14-3(10) defines "Health Care," and code 
section 78-14-3(15) defines "Malpractice action against a health care provider." 
In order for the Act to apply Ms. Dowling's interaction with Ms. Bullen must 
qualify as "health Care" as defined in the Act. The Act defines health care as: 
any act or treatment performed ox furnished, or which should have been 
performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a 
patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement. 
(emphasis added) Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3 (10) (2002). The Act appears to be all 
encompassing in that it covers "any act or treatment performed or furnished" by the 
health care provider. The issue, however, falls on what the legislature intended "any act 
or treatment" to mean. Surely the legislature would have required that the act or treatment 
be of the type the health care provider was trained to provide in that it relates to medical 
or health care. In the present matter, Ms. Bullen's actions could not have been the type 
that the legislature would have contemplated in its "any act or treatment" language. Ms. 
Bullen's behavior in starting a sexual relationship with Mr. Dowling during his therapy, 
thereby alienating Ms. Dowling, cannot be considered an "act or treatment" which was 
"performed or furnished during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement" 
because it did not relate to or arise out of medical treatment or healthcare treatment. Utah 
Code Ann. §78-14-3 (10) (15) (2002). 
The case of Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 (Utahl991), is illustrative of the 
foregoing argument. In Norton, Macfarlane the Defendant as a physician "developed an 
improper and undue influence over Sherry Norton and that he induced her by means of 
that influence to abandon and leave her husband, home and children." Norton, 818 P.2d 
at 9. In Norton the plaintiff was able to pursue his cause of action against the physician 
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that used his influence to induce his spouse Sherry Norton into leaving the marriage. Id at 
15. The most significant fact is that the Act is not mentioned in the case anywhere as a 
defense. Presumably, because Dr. Macfarlane's actions of beginning a sexual relationship 
with his patient were so far removed from anything closely related to the medical 
profession that the Act was inapplicable. 
II . The Appellate Court's Decision is Distinguishable with Jensen v. IHC 
Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997). 
In reaching its decision the Utah Court of Appeals focused on sections 78-14-
3(10) and 78-14-3(15) of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (hereinafter "the Act"). 
2002 UT App. 372 ff 8-9. The Appellate Court noted that when these two sections of the 
statute were read as a whole the Act required "that the healthcare in question must have 
been provided to the complaining patient," and when applied to Dowling, the Appellate 
Court noted that she was not complaining about her healthcare nor was she the 
complaining patient. Id at ff 9-10. Petitioner claims that the Appellate Court's opinion 
conflicts with this Court's decision in Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1997). 
In Jensen, Shelly Hipwell (hereinafter "Hipwell"), a young pregnant mother 
experienced severe abdominal pains the day before she was scheduled to be induced and 
deliver her second child. 944 P.2d at 329. Hipwell went to the emergency room at the 
McKay-Dee Hospital, on December 12, 1988, after experiencing the pains and was 
subsequently sent home. Id. Hipwell returned the following day to McKay-Dee for a 
caesarian delivery and experienced numerous complications while delivering. Id. 
Hipwell was transferred from McKay-Dee to the University of Utah Hospital and 
while there she suffered "anoxic brain damage after a resident physician punctured her 
1 1 
heart with a biopsy needle, leaving her in a coma, totally and permanently disabled." Id 
Hipwell eventually died three and a half years later on May 27,1992. Id. No complaint 
was filed in the matter until July 29, 1992, some three and a half years after the alleged 
medical malpractice took place and three months after Hip well's death. 
This Court was presented with the issue of whether the wrongful death statute of 
limitations, found in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-28(2), or the Act's statute of limitations 
found in §78-14-4, governed the survivors' claims. This Court was faced with two 
statutes that purportedly covered the same subject. To resolve the dilemma this Court 
sought to determine legislative intent to guide it in its choice of statutes. 944 P.2d at 331. 
This Court in reaching its decision followed the general rules of statutory construction, 
which posit that "the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the 
statute," Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 1993) (citing Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)), and that " 'a more 
specific statute governs instead of a more general statute.'" De Baritault v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 748 (Utah 1996) (quoting Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 
1145 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). 
This Court then stated that the Medical Malpractice Act's plain language 
"indicates a legislative intent to have the statute apply to claims" like those being brought 
by Hipwell. Jensen at 331. This Court noted that §78-14-4 of the Act provides, "No 
malpractice action ... may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers ... the injury." Jensen at 331 (quoting Utah Code Ann. 78-
14_4 (1996)). Malpractice action is defined under the Act as "any action against a health 
care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, 
based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or 
which should have been rendered by the health care provider." Jensen at 332 (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. 78-14-3(14) (1996))(emphasis added). The Act was determined to be 
more specific in that it specifically lists wrongful death as being subject to the Act's 
statute of limitations. Jensen at 332. 
In applying Jensen to the Court of Appeals decision, it is very apparent that the 
two cases are distinguishable. First, the malpractice that occurred in Jensen, arose out of 
and was related to the treatment furnished by Shelly Hipwell's physician to Shelly 
Hipwell during her medical care, (emphasis added). These facts when juxtaposed with the 
decision by the Court of Appeals do not cause contradiction or conflict rather they show 
two completely different factual scenarios. 
These factually distinct scenarios are more easily understood after having 
analyzed two sections of the Act. The Court of Appeals analyzed sections 78-14-3(10) 
and 78-14-3(15), which led it to conclude that the Act "requires that the healthcare in 
question must have been provided to the complaining patient." 2002 UT App. 372 at \ 9. 
In comparing Jensen with the Court of Appeals decision the factual distinction arises 
when comparison is made regarding the complaining patients. In Jensen the complaining 
patient was Ms. Hipwell, who ultimately passed away because of the malpractice 
committed against her. In the Court of Appeals decision James Hoagland would need to 
be classified, like Ms. Hipwell, as the complaining patient in order to be factually similar. 
However, James Hoagland is not the complaining patient and as of this date James 
Hoagland has yet to complain of his treatment with Bullen and presumably will never 
bring a claim being that they are married. The Court of Appeal's application of its 
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complaining patient theory to Dowling's alienation of affection claim reveals the factual 
distinction of the two cases. The Court of Appeals stated the following: 
Dowling's alienation of affection claim while arguably 'relating to or arising out 
of health care rendered to James (citations omitted), did not relate to or arise out 
of the health care rendered to Dowling. Dowling the patient, has not complained 
of "any act or treatment performed or furnished ... by [Bullen] for, to, or on 
behalf of [Dowling] during [Dowling's] medical care or confinement." Utah Code 
Ann. §78-14-3(10). 
As stated, in Jensen, Ms. Hipwell's claim of malpractice related to and arose out of the 
health care rendered to her and therefore her relative's claims arose out of the same 
health 
care rendered to her. Therefore, the Court of Appeals was justified in classifying 
Dowling's alienation of affection claim outside the scope of the Act's two-year statute of 
limitations. 
III. The Court of Appeals Interpreted the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
According to its Plain Meaning, Which Resulted in a Logical outcome. 
The Court of Appeals followed two sections of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act to their logical conclusion in reaching its decision. The two sections are Utah Code 
Ann. §78-14-3(10) and §78-14-3(15). Section 78-14-3(10) defines "health care" as: 
any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been 
performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a 
patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement. 
Section 78-3-(15) defines "malpractice action" as: 
any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of 
warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries 
relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been 
rendered by the health care provider. 
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The Court of Appeals reached the conclusion that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
(the "Act") applies when health care is provided "for, to, or on behalf of a patient during 
the patient's medical care." See UT App. 372 at f 9. The Appellate Court read the 
aforementioned section of the Act in conjunction with section 78-14-3(15), "which 
requires that the injuries relate to or arise out of 'health care/" which led the Appellate 
Court to hold that "the Act requires that the health care in question must have been 
provided to the complaining patient." See UT App. 372 at f 9, Utah Code Ann. §78-14-
3(15). 
The Court of Appeals interpretation of the Act is the logical conclusion to the 
plain language found therein. Derivative claims such as subrogation, indemnity and the 
like are not extinguished with the Court of Appeals interpretation of the Act so long as 
the health care out of which the derivative claim arises is "provided for, to, or on behalf 
of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment or confinement." UT App. 372 at 
f 9, Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(15) (emphasis added). Dowling's claim of alienation of 
affection does not relate to health care "provided for [her], to [her], or on [her] behalf 
during [her] medical care treatment or confinement" Utah Code Ann. §78-14-
3(15).(emphasis added). Furthermore, malpractice actions under the Act must "[relate] to 
or [arise] out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health 
care provider." As the Court of Appeals correctly determined Dowling's claim of 
alienation of affection did not relate to or arise out of the health care that Bullen provided 
to her. UTApp. 372 at <I 10. 
The Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals has removed the malpractice 
claim of breach of confidentiality. The Petitioner assumes too much; all breach of 
1 ^ 
confidentiality malpractice actions will be subject to the Act so long as the complaint or 
derivative action is brought by or on behalf of the "complaining patient." See UT App. 
372 at 19. 
The Petitioner further argues that BuUen's treatment of James was on Dowling's 
behalf because she was trying to help Dowling, James and the two daughters all at the 
same time. Once again the Petitioner assumes more than the facts have revealed. We do 
not know the details of BuUen's sessions with James and we cannot make the assumption 
that those sessions were of benefit to Dowling. Furthermore, the Act makes it clear that 
the health care must be "during the patient's medical care, treatment or confinement." 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(10)(emphasis added). To impute that James' counseling 
sessions were of benefit to Dowling and that they were "during [Dowling's] medical care, 
treatment, or confinement" is to use the statute in an absurd manner. Bullen counseled 
James individually, presumably, because of the status of James and Dowling's family 
those sessions were not of benefit to Dowling nor were they during Dowling's medical 
care. 
IV. The Court of Appeals Decision is Based on Facts that are Supported 
by the Record. 
The Court of Appeals correctly recognizes that Dowling's alienation of affection 
allegation did not arise out of or relate to her medical treatment nor was it provided for, 
to, or on her behalf. UT App. 372 at \ 9, Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(15), Utah Code Ann. 
§78-14-3(10). In Dowling's complaint the alienation of affection claim expressly relates 
to BuUen's treatment of James. The allegations state "Defendant Bullen, by her actions in 
divulging Plaintiffs confidences, used her position of trust and influence as a licensed 
clinical social worker and family counselor, to poison Plaintiffs husband against 
16 
Plaintiff." Complaint, R. at 7, f 53. The only time that Bullen would have been capable 
of alienating Dowling's affections would have been when Bullen and James were alone. 
The Petitioner's position that Dowling's complaint did not allege that the actions by 
Bullen were undertaken only during the treatment of James is erroneous based on the 
above argument. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is not applicable to Dowling's alienation 
of affections claim, and therefore this Court should uphold the decision made by the 
Court of Appeals by holding that the general four year statute of limitations is applicable. 
Dated this LT day of June, 2003. 
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Attorney for the Respondent Suzanne Dowling 
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